

Fundamental Theory of Asset Pricing

$X \sim N(\mu, \sigma^2)$: $M_X(t) = \mathbb{E} \left[e^{-tX} \right] = \exp(\mu t + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 t^2)$
 $M_X(t) = \mathbb{E} \left[e^{-\sum_{i=1}^n t_i X_i} \right] = \exp(t' \mu + \frac{1}{2} t' \Sigma t)$, with $t \in \mathbb{R}^n$.

Arrow-Debreu State-Space Framework

t = 1 State Space: $\Omega = \{\omega_1, \dots, \omega_M\} \implies$ **M states**

K Agents $k = 1, 2, \dots, K$ **N Assets** $n = 1, 2, \dots, N$

Endowment: $e^k := [e_0^k, e^k]' = [e_0^k, e_{11}^k, \dots, e_{1M}^k]' \in \mathbb{R}^{1+M}$

Consump Plan: $c^k := [c_0^k, c^k]' = [c_0^k, c_{11}^k, \dots, c_{1M}^k]' \in \mathbb{R}^{1+M}$

Consump. Set: $C := \{c^k : \text{feas.}\} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^{1+M}$; Usual: $C = \mathbb{R}_+^{1+M}$

Prop: C is a **closed** + **convex** subset of $\mathbb{R}^{1+M}$.

Budget Set: Set of consumption plans given by purchasing θ :

$B(e, \{D_1, P\}) := \{c \geq 0 : \theta \in \mathbb{R}^N, c_0^k = e_0 - P'\theta, c_1^k = e_1 + D_1\theta\}$

Complete, No redund: $\text{rank}(D_1) = M = N \implies \theta = D^{-1}(c_1 - e_1)$

$\implies B(e, \{D_1, P\}) = \{c_1 \in \mathbb{R}_+^M : P'D_1^{-1}(c_1 - e_1) \leq e_0\}$

Payoff Vector: $D_{1n} = [D_{11}, \dots, D_{1M}]' \in \mathbb{R}^M$, $D_{1\omega}$ at $t = 1$ state ω .

Market Structure: $D_1 = [D_{11}, \dots, D_{1N}] = [D_{1\omega n}]_{M \times N} \in \mathbb{R}^{M \times N}$

Price: $P_n \in \mathbb{R}$: price of security n at $t = 0$.

Price Vector: $P = [P_1, \dots, P_N]' \in \mathbb{R}^N$ at $t = 0$.

Portfolio: $\theta = [\theta_1, \dots, \theta_N] \in \mathbb{R}^N \implies \text{cost}_{t=0} = -P'\theta$, payoff $_{t=1} = D_1\theta$.

B Matrix: $B := [-P', D']' \in \mathbb{R}^{(M+1) \times N}$.

Prop: $c = e + B'\theta = [e_0 - P'\theta, [e_{1m} + \sum_{n=1}^N D_{1nm}\theta_n]_{M \times 1}]$

Market Clearing: $\sum_{k=1}^K \theta^k(P, e^k) = 0$ i.e. $\sum_{k=1}^K c^k = \sum_{k=1}^K e^k$.

Arbitrage

Redundant Security: $\exists \theta_{\setminus n}$ s.t. $D_{\setminus n} \theta_{\setminus n} = D_n$

Prop: $\text{rank}(D_1) < N = \text{redundant}$; $\text{rank}(D_1) < M = \text{Incompl}$

$(\text{Im}(D_1) \subsetneq \mathbb{R}^M)$; $\text{rank}(D_1) = N = M = \text{Compl} + \text{no redund}$

Payoff Space:

$C_1(D_1) := \{c_1 = D_1\theta \in \mathbb{R}^M : \theta \in \mathbb{R}^N\} = \text{span}(D_1, \dots, D_N) \subseteq \mathbb{R}^M$

Complete Market: $\text{rank}(D) = M$ (need $N = M$)

AD Securities: $D^{AD} := \mathbb{I}_{N \times N}$ (complete market):

$\rightarrow$ construct using portfolio $\theta = D^{-1}(\cdot)$ $D\theta = \mathbb{I} = D^{AD}$

State Prices: $\phi = (D^{-1})'P$, $P' = \Phi'D$; ϕ_ω = price of e_ω at $t = 0$.

Arbitrage Existence: $\iff \exists \theta \in \mathbb{R}^N$ s.t. $B\theta > 0 \iff \exists \phi \gg 0$

ex: **CIP Formula** Forward contract price: $F = S_{e \rightarrow s} \times \frac{1+r_s}{1+r_e}$

Fundamental Thm of Asset Pricing (FTAP)

Valuation Op: V positive Linear Operator

Theorem (FTAP) $\text{NA} \iff \exists \phi \gg 0$ s.t. $P' = \phi'D$ ($P = D'\phi$)

Note: If $\text{rank}(D) = N$, then $D'D$ full rank: $P' = \phi'D'D$.

$\implies \theta^* = (D'D)^{-1}P$, $\phi^* = D(D'D)^{-1}P$ and $\eta^* = \phi^* \text{Diag}(p)^{-1}$

Note: Redund asset $\implies \phi$ **not unique**. If $\beta\phi \gg 0 \implies \exists$ arb

Example: (Incomplete Market) $D = (1, 2, 3)'$, $P = 1$:

$\implies \theta = \{\phi \gg 0 : \phi'D = 1\} = \{\phi \gg 0 : \phi_1 + 2\phi_2 + 3\phi_3 = 1\}$.

Price $D_2 = (2, 2, 2)'$: P_2

Example: (Incomplete Market II) Find price P_b of new security

with payoff b s.t. $b \notin \text{span}(D_1)$ (i.e., not redundant):

$P_b = \{\phi b : \phi \gg 0, P' = \phi'D_1\}$ i.e., $\inf_{\phi \in \Phi \gg 0} \phi'b < P_b < \sup_{\phi \in \Phi \gg 0} \phi'b$

If Security b is redundant: $P_b = \{P\theta : \theta \in \mathbb{R}^n, D_1\theta = b\} = \phi'b$.

State-Price Density/Risk Neutral Measure

Risk-Neutral Pricing:

1. $P' = \phi'D \implies$ get state prices ϕ .

2. Get RF rate: $1 + r^f = \frac{1}{\sum \omega} \phi_\omega$.

3. Construct $\mathbb{Q} = \left\{ q_\omega = \frac{\phi_\omega}{\sum \omega' \phi_{\omega'}} = (1 + r^f) \phi_\omega \right\}$.

4. Price any asset with payoff vector D_n :

$P_n = \frac{\mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{Q}}[D_n]}{1 + r^f} = \frac{1}{1 + r^f} \sum \omega q_\omega D_{n\omega}$.

5. Get **Expected Return:** $1 + \bar{r}_n = (1 + r^f) \frac{\mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}}[D_n]}{\mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{Q}}[D_n]}$.

SDF/SPD: $P_n = \phi'D_n = \sum \phi_\omega D_{n\omega} = \sum p_\omega \frac{\phi_\omega}{p_\omega} D_{n\omega}$

Proposition ($\mathbb{P} \sim \mathbb{Q}$) $\mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}}[X] = \frac{1}{1 + r^f} \mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{Q}} \left[\frac{X}{\phi} \right]$, & $\phi_\omega = \frac{q_\omega}{1 + r^f} = p_\omega \eta_\omega$

SPD/SDF Pricing: you must know $\mathbb{P} = \{p_\omega\}$:

1. $P' = \phi'D \implies$ get state prices ϕ .

2. Get SPD/SDF: $\eta = \frac{\phi_\omega}{p_\omega}$.

3. Price any asset with payoff vector D_n :

$P_n = \mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}}[\eta D_n] = \sum \omega p_\omega \eta_\omega D_{n\omega}$.

4. Get **Expected Return:** $1 + \bar{r}_n = \frac{\mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}}[D_n]}{P_n} = \frac{\mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}}[D_n]}{\mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}}[\eta D_n]}$.

5. Get RF rate: $1 + r^f = \frac{1}{\mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}}[\eta]}$.

Discounted Cash Flow (DCF)/Present Value (PV) Formula:

Discount Rate/Expected Rate of Return:

$1 + \bar{r}_n = \frac{\mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}}[D_n]}{P_n} = \frac{\mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}}[D_n]}{\mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}}[\eta D_n]} = (1 + r^f) \frac{\mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}}[D_n]}{\mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{Q}}[D_n]} = \frac{\mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{Q}}[D_n/\eta]}{\mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{Q}}[D_n]}$.

Gross Return: $R_{t+1} = \frac{\text{Payoff}(t+1)}{\text{Payoff}(t)} = \frac{X_{t+1}}{P_t} = \frac{D_t + P_t}{P_t}$

Net Ret: $r_t = 1 + R_t$. Random $\tilde{r}_n : r_{n\omega} = \frac{D_{n\omega}}{P_n} - 1$

Note: $\tilde{r}_{1\omega} = r^f$, $\mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}}[\tilde{r}_n] = \bar{r}_n$, and $1 + \tilde{r}_n = \frac{D_n}{P_n}$

Excess Ret: $= r_t - r^f$. **Risk Prem:** $\pi_t = \mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}}[\tilde{r}_n - r^f] = \bar{r}_n - r^f$.

Sharpe: $SR_t = \frac{\mathbb{E}[r_t - r^f]}{\text{Std}(r_t - r^f)} = \frac{\mathbb{E}[\text{return}]}{\text{Unit Risk}}$.

Prop: (DCF/PV) $P_n = \frac{\mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}}[D_n]}{1 + \bar{r}_n} = \frac{\sum \omega p_\omega D_{n\omega}}{1 + \bar{r}_n} = \phi'D_n$

$P_1 = \sum \omega \phi_\omega = \frac{1}{1 + r^f}$ and $\bar{r}_1 = \frac{\mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}}[D_1]}{P_1} - 1 = \frac{1}{P_1} - 1 = r^f$

Prop: **Risk Prem** $\mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}}[1 + \tilde{r}_n] = (1 + r^f) \left(1 - \text{Cov}^{\mathbb{P}}(\eta, 1 + \tilde{r}_n) \right)$

$\implies \pi_n = \mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}}[\tilde{r}_n - r^f] = -(1 + r^f) \text{Cov}^{\mathbb{P}}(\eta, \tilde{r}_n - r^f)$

and $\mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{Q}}[\tilde{r}_n] = r^f \forall n \implies \mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{Q}}[\tilde{r}_n - r^f] = 0 \forall n$

Note: $\rho(\eta, D_n) = 0 \implies \bar{r}_n = r^f$ (but $\tilde{r}_n \neq r^f$) and $P_n = \frac{\mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}}[D_n]}{1 + r^f}$

Prop: (Hansen-Jagannathan) $SR_n := \frac{\mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}}[\tilde{r}_n - r^f]}{\sqrt{\text{Var}^{\mathbb{P}}(\tilde{r}_n - r^f)}} \leq \frac{\sqrt{\text{Var}^{\mathbb{P}}(\eta)}}{\mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}}[\eta]}$

FTAP: Corporate Finance

y_0 : investment into the production opportunity at $t = 0$

$y_{1\omega} = y_\omega(y_0)$, $\forall \omega \in \Omega$: prod output at $t = 1$ $y_\omega(0) = 0$, $y'_\omega \geq 0$, $y''_\omega < 0$

Investment NPV $v = \phi'y - y_0 = \sum \omega \phi_\omega y_\omega(y_0) - y_0$

Agent's $t = 0$ Wealth $w = e_0 - y_0 + \phi'(e_1 + y_1) = e_0 + \phi'e_1 + v$

Agent's Opt Pb: $\max_{y_0, e_0, c_1} u([c_0, c_1]')$ s.t. $w = c_0 + \phi'e_1$

Agent's Consumption: $c_0 = e_0 - y_0$, $c_1 = e_1 + y_1$

Corporate Investment Decisions: $j = 1..F$ firms: $y_j(y_{j0}) \in \mathbb{R}^M$

s_{kj} = share of firm j owned by agent k : $\sum_k s_{kj} = 1, \forall j$

Firm's investment NPV at $t = 0$: $v_j = \phi'y_j(y_{j0}) - y_{j0}$, $\forall k$ (MAX IT)

Agent k 's wealth: $w_k = e_{k0} + \phi'e_{k1} + \sum_j s_{kj} v_j$

Prop: $y_1 = d_1 + e_1$, $D = \phi'd_1$, $E = \phi'e_1$ and $V = D + E = \phi'y_1$.

NPV(Equity) $= \phi'(y_1 - d_1) - e_0 = \phi'y_1 - (d_0 + e_0) = \phi'y_1 - y_0$

Example: (Labor vs Wage) Firm: hire L labor at wage W

$\implies$ produce output $Y(L) = AL^\alpha$ ($\alpha < 1$), $\log A \sim N(A, \sigma_A^2)$

Can borrow at r^f , and Log-SDF: $\log M = \delta + \varepsilon$, $\varepsilon \sim N(0, \sigma_\varepsilon^2)$

Firm's pb: $\max_L - WL + \mathbb{E}[MAL^\alpha] \implies L = (\alpha \mathbb{E}[MA]/W)^{1/(1-\alpha)}$

FTAP: Fundamental Value of a Stocks

CFs: $X_t = D_t + P_t$ (div + share price) **Ret:** $R_t = \frac{X_t}{P_t} = \frac{D_t + P_t}{P_t}$.

(PV) $P_t = \mathbb{E}_t^{\mathbb{P}}[\eta_{t+1}(P_{t+1} + D_{t+1})] = \mathbb{E}_t^{\mathbb{Q}} \left[\sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \frac{D_{t+k}}{(1 + r^f)^k} \right]$

$\implies P_t = \mathbb{E}_t^{\mathbb{P}} \left[\sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \eta_{t:t+k} D_{t+k} \right]$ with $\eta_{t:t+k} := \prod_{j=1}^k \eta_{t+j}$

k^{th} **Period Ret** $\mathbb{E}_t^{\mathbb{P}} \left[R_{t:t+k}^{(k)} \right] = \frac{\mathbb{E}_t^{\mathbb{P}}[D_{t+k}]}{\mathbb{E}_t^{\mathbb{P}}[\eta_{t:t+k} D_{t+k}]} = \frac{\mathbb{E}_t[\text{Payoff}]}{\text{Price}}$

$\implies P_t^{(k)} = \mathbb{E}_t^{\mathbb{P}}[\eta_{t:t+k} D_{t+k}] = \mathbb{E}_t^{\mathbb{P}}[D_{t+k}] / \mathbb{E}_t^{\mathbb{P}}[R_{t:t+k}^{(k)}]$

(DCF) $P_t = \mathbb{E}_t^{\mathbb{P}} \left[\sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \eta_{t:t+k} D_{t+k} \right] = \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \mathbb{E}_t^{\mathbb{P}}[D_{t+k}] / \mathbb{E}_t^{\mathbb{P}}[R_{t:t+k}^{(k)}]$

FTAP: Fixed Income Securities

$P_{N,t}$ = price of N -period bond at time t that pays $FV = 1\$$ at $t + N$.

1 period: $N = 1$, state $s_t = j$: $P_{1,t} = P_1(j) = \mathbb{E}_t[\eta_{t+1}]$

N: $P_{N,t} = \mathbb{E}_t[\eta_{t+1} P_{N-1,t+1}] = \mathbb{E}_t[\eta_{t+1} \times \dots \times \eta_{t+N}] = \mathbb{E}_t[\eta_{t:t+N}]$

Yield Curve (YC)/ Term Structure of Interest Rates:

YTM: $Y_{N,t} = \left[\frac{1}{P_{N,t}} \right]^{1/N} = [\text{payoff/price}]^{1/N} \longrightarrow P_{N,t} = \left[\frac{1}{Y_{N,t}} \right]^N$

Log-Framework $p_{N,t} = \log P_{N,t}$, $y_{N,t} = \log Y_{N,t}$ **$p_{N,t} = -N \cdot y_{N,t}$**

Proposition (YC Recipe) $P_{N,t} = \mathbb{E}_t[\eta_{t:t+N}]$: YC $\iff$ moments of SDF

(1) Define State Variables: x_t (data $\rightarrow$ need at least 3).

(2) Assume SDF $\eta_t = \eta(x_t)$ or Log SDF $m_t = \log \eta_t$.

(3) Give law of motion for x_t under $\mathbb{P}$ (use $\pi(x_{t+1}, x_t)$)

OR Give law of motion for x_t under $\mathbb{Q}$ (use r^f)

(4) Sol $^\circ$: Iterate on pricing eq. $P_N(x_t) = \mathbb{E}_t[\eta(x_{t+1}) P_{N-1}(x_{t+1}) | x_t]$

(5) Guess $p_{N,t} = \log(P_{N,t}) \sim$ affine in x_t & find coeffs

Example: (Vasicek model, 1977)

(1) **One State Variable:** x_t

(2) **Assume Log SDF:** $m_{t+1} = \log(\eta_{t+1}) = -x_t - \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{\lambda}{\sigma} \right)^2 - \frac{\lambda}{\sigma} \varepsilon_{t+1}$.

(3) **AR(1)** under $\mathbb{P}$: $x_{t+1} = \mu + \phi x_t + \sigma \varepsilon_{t+1}$; with $\phi < 1$, $\varepsilon_t \stackrel{\text{iid}}{\sim} N(0, 1)$

(4) **Sol $^\circ$:** Iterate on $p_{N,t} = \log \mathbb{E}_t[\exp(m_{t+1} + p_{N-1,t+1}) | x_t]$

Use: $(x_{t+1} | \mathcal{F}_t) \sim N(\mu + \phi x_t, \sigma)$ and $(m_{t+1} | \mathcal{F}_t) \sim N(-x_t - \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{\lambda}{\sigma} \right)^2, \frac{\lambda}{\sigma})$

$p_{1,t} = \log \mathbb{E}_t[\exp(m_{t+1})] = -x_t - \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{\lambda}{\sigma} \right)^2 + \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{\lambda}{\sigma} \right)^2 = 0 - 1 \cdot x_t$

$\implies$ **Short Rate:** $x_t = y_{1t} = \log(1 + r^f) \longrightarrow$ **mean-reverting** AR(1)

$p_{2,t} = \log \mathbb{E}_t[\exp(m_{t+1} + p_{1,t+1})] = \log \mathbb{E}_t[\exp(m_{t+1} - x_{t+1})]$

$= -(1 + \phi)x_t + \left[-\frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{\lambda}{\sigma} \right)^2 + \mu + \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{\lambda}{\sigma} + \sigma \right)^2 \right] = A_2 + B_2 \cdot x_t$

(5) **Guess** $p_{n,t} = A_n + B_n \cdot x_t$:

$p_{n,t} = A_n + B_n \cdot x_t \implies p_{n+1,t} = A_{n+1} + B_{n+1} \cdot x_t$ with:

$B_n = -1 + \phi B_{n-1} = -\frac{1 - \phi^n}{1 - \phi}$

$A_n = A_{n-1} + B_{n-1}(\mu - \lambda) + \frac{1}{2} B_{n-1}^2 \sigma^2$

Example: (Cox-Ingersoll-Ross, 1985)

(1) **One State Variable:** x_t

(2) **Assume Log SDF:** $m_{t+1} = -x_t - \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{\lambda}{\sigma} \right)^2 x_t - \left(\frac{\lambda}{\sigma} \right) x_t^{0.5} \varepsilon_{t+1}$.

(3) **Under $\mathbb{P}$:** $x_{t+1} = \mu + \phi x_t + \sigma x_t^{0.5} \varepsilon_{t+1}$; with $\phi < 1$, $\varepsilon_t \stackrel{\text{iid}}{\sim} N(0, 1)$

(4) **Sol $^\circ$:** Iterate on $p_{N,t} = \log \mathbb{E}_t[\exp(m_{t+1} + p_{N-1,t+1}) | x_t]$

Use: $(m_{t+1} | x_t) = \text{cst} - \left(\frac{\lambda}{\sigma} \right) x_t^{0.5} \varepsilon_{t+1}$ and $(p_{N-1,t+1} | x_t) \perp \varepsilon_{t+1}$

$\implies (m_{t+1} + p_{N-1,t+1} | x_t) \sim N(\mathbb{E}_t[m_{t+1} + p_{N-1,t+1}], \text{SD}_t[m_{t+1} + p_{N-1,t+1}])$

$\implies p_{N,t} = \mathbb{E}_t[m_{t+1} + p_{N-1,t+1}] + \frac{1}{2} \text{Var}_t[m_{t+1} + p_{N-1,t+1}]$

$\implies p_{N,t} = \mathbb{E}_t[m_{t+1} + p_{N-1,t+1}] + \frac{1}{2} \text{Var}_t[m_{t+1}]$

$+ \$

FTAP: Options

Underlying Asset X_t = Payoff of asset at time $T > t$,
s.t. $f(X_T)$ = payoff of derivative security at $T > t$, $f(\cdot)$ known.

Prop: Replication Price: Given η : $P_t^D = \mathbb{E}_t[\eta_{t:T} \cdot f(X_T)]$

$T = 1$: **maturity/exercise date**; K = **strike/exercise price**

Payoff: Call $c_1 = [S_1 - K]_+$, Put $p_1 = [K - S_1]_+$.

$c(S, K) = V(c_1)$: **call price**; $p(S, K) = V(p_1)$: **put price**

$c(S, K) \searrow$ + convex in K and $p(S, K) \nearrow$ in K

(**Intrinsic Value**) Call: $I = S - K$; Put: $I = K - S$

In-The-Money: $I > 0$, $S > K$ (call), $K > S$ (put)

Portf of Options: $c(S', \theta, K', \theta) \leq \sum_{i=1}^N \theta_i c(S_i, K_i)$

and $p(S', \theta, K', \theta) \leq \sum_{i=1}^N \theta_i p(S_i, K_i)$

Prop: Bounds: $\left[S - \frac{K}{1+r^f} \right]_+ \leq c(S, K) \leq S$

Prop: Put-Call Parity: $c(S, K) + \frac{K}{1+r^f} + D_{t=0} = p(S, K) + S$

Price: $C(S, K)$ **American Call**, $P(S, K)$ **American Put**

Prop: D = Divid ($t = 0$), S = ex-divid price $P(S, D, K)$

$= \max\{K - S - D, p(S, K)\}$; $C(S, D, K) = \max\{S + D - K, c(S, K)\}$

Prop: Binomial $c(S, K) = \phi_u[uS - K]_+ + \phi_d[dS - K]_+$ with

$$\begin{cases} c_u = [uS - K]_+ \\ c_d = [dS - K]_+ \end{cases} \quad \begin{cases} \phi_u = \frac{1}{1+r^f} \frac{1+r^f-d}{u-d} \\ \phi_d = \frac{1}{1+r^f} \frac{u-1-r^f}{u-d} \end{cases} \quad (\because) \quad \begin{cases} S = \phi_u uS + \phi_d dS \\ \phi_u + \phi_d = 1 \end{cases}$$

Replic Portfolio $\theta = [\theta_S, \theta_B]'$ $c(S, K) = \theta_S S + \theta_B \frac{1}{1+r^f}$ with

$$\begin{cases} \text{payoff}_u = \theta_S uS + \theta_B \stackrel{!}{=} c_u \\ \text{payoff}_d = \theta_S dS + \theta_B \stackrel{!}{=} c_d \end{cases} \quad (\because) \quad \begin{cases} \theta_S = \frac{c_u - c_d}{(u-d)S} \\ \theta_B = \frac{uc_d - dc_u}{u-d} \end{cases}$$

Risk-Neut $c(S, K) = \frac{\mathbb{E}^Q[S - K]_+}{1+r^f} = \frac{qc_u + (1-q)c_d}{1+r^f} \quad (\because) \quad q = \frac{1+r^f-d}{u-d}$

Exact Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT)

Prop: SDF Portf: $\eta = \mathbb{E}^P[r_{-n}] + \mathbb{E}^P[\eta] - r_{-n}$

$\mathbb{E}[\text{returns}]$ **Decomp** $\pi_n = \mathbb{E}^P[r_n - r^f] = \frac{\text{Cov}^P(r_n, r_{-n})}{\text{Var}^P(\eta)} \cdot \lambda = \beta_n \cdot \lambda$

with $\lambda := \mathbb{E}^P[r_{-n}] - r^f = (1 + r^f) \text{Var}^P(\eta)$

Idiosyncr Risk: $r_{n,t} - r^f = \alpha_n + \beta_n(r_{-n,t} - r^f) + \varepsilon_{n,t}$

Prop: Var Deco: $\text{Var}(r_n - r^f) = \beta_n^2 \text{Var}(r_{-n} - r^f) + \text{Var}(\varepsilon_n)$

Factor Structure F: Basis for D , $\text{rank}(D) = K \leq M \rightarrow \exists$ redund

$F = [F_1, \dots, F_K] \in \mathbb{R}^{M \times K}$, and $F_k \in \mathbb{R}^{M \times 1}$; **Beta** $\beta_Z \in \mathbb{R}^K$;

$C = \{D\theta : \theta \in \mathbb{R}^N\}$; $\forall Z \in C, \exists \beta_Z = [\beta_{Z1}, \dots, \beta_{ZK}]'$ s.t. $Z = F\beta_Z$

Factor Pricing: $R_n = \bar{R}_n + \varepsilon_n = \bar{R}_n + F\beta_n = \bar{R}_n + \sum_{k=1}^K F_k \beta_{nk}$

$\Rightarrow R = \bar{R} + \varepsilon = \bar{R} + F\beta$ (so need $\mathbb{E}^P[F\beta] = 0$, $\mathbb{E}^P[\varepsilon_n] = 0$)

$\rightarrow$ One RF factor $\iota := F_1 = \mathbf{1}_M$ and $(K-1)$ risk factors

Prop: Exact APT: Let $R_n = \bar{R}_n + F\beta_n$, $n = 1, \dots, N$, where:

(1) $F = [F_1, \dots, F_K]$ (K risk factors, $\mathbb{E}^P[F_k] = 0$)

(2) $\beta_n = [\beta_{n1}, \dots, \beta_{nK}]'$ (asset n 's beta)

N.A. $\Rightarrow \bar{R}_n - R^f = \bar{r}_n - r^f = \sum_{k=1}^K \lambda_k \beta_{nk} = \lambda' \beta_n$, $n = 1, \dots, N$

where $\lambda_k = -\mathbb{E}^Q[F_k] = \bar{r}_k - r^f$ ($\bar{r}_k$ = fact k) and $\lambda = [\lambda_1, \dots, \lambda_K]'$

Risk-Free Portf: set $\beta_{\text{portf}} = \sum_k \theta_k \beta_k = 0$, $\sum_k \theta_k = 1$

Factor Portf: set $\beta_{\text{portf}} = \sum_k \theta_k \beta_k = 1$, $\sum_k \theta_k = 1$

General Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT)

Model for Ret: $r_n = \bar{r}_n + \sum_{k=1}^K \beta_{nk} F_k + \varepsilon_n$, for $(r = \bar{r} + F\beta + \varepsilon)$

with: (1) $\mathbb{E}^P[F_k] = \mathbb{E}^P[\varepsilon_n] = \mathbb{E}^P[\varepsilon_n F_k] = 0$, $\forall k, n$

(2) $\mathbb{E}^P[\varepsilon_n^2] = \sigma_\varepsilon^2 < v < \infty$, and $\mathbb{E}^P[\varepsilon_n \varepsilon_{n'}] = 0 \forall n \neq n'$

$\text{Var}^P(r_n) = \beta_n' \mathbb{E}^P[F'F] \beta_n + \text{Var}^P(\varepsilon_n)$, $\text{Cov}^P(r_i, r_j) = \beta_i' \mathbb{E}^P[F'F] \beta_j$

Portf Ret: $r_\theta = \bar{r}_\theta + F\beta_\theta + \varepsilon_\theta$ ($r_\theta = \theta r$, $\bar{r}_\theta = \theta \bar{r}$, $\beta_\theta = \theta \beta$, $\varepsilon_\theta = \theta \varepsilon$)

Div Port: $\theta_n = O(1/n)$, $\theta = [\theta_1, \dots, \theta_N]'$, $\theta' \mathbf{1}_N = \sum_{n=1}^N \theta_n = 1$

Div Seq: $\{\theta_n\}_{n=1}^\infty$, with $\theta_n' \mathbf{1}_n = \sum_{i=1}^n \theta_{n,i} = 1$, is Well-Diversified

$\Leftrightarrow \exists \kappa \in (0, \infty)$, s.t. $\theta_{n,i}^2 \leq \kappa/n^2$, $\forall i = 1, \dots, n$, $\forall n \geq 1$

Div Thm: $\{\theta_n\}_{n=1}^\infty$ div seq: $\text{Var}^P(\varepsilon_{\theta_n}) = \text{Var}^P(\sum_{i=1}^n \theta_{n,i} \varepsilon_i) \rightarrow 0$

Asy Arb: $\{\theta_n\}_{n=1}^\infty$ s.t. $\mathbf{1}_n' \theta_n = 0$, $\mathbb{E}^P[r_{\theta_n}] \rightarrow \alpha > 0$, $\text{Var}^P(r_{\theta_n}) \rightarrow 0$

Prop: NAA $\Rightarrow$ NA

Prop: APT: Given NAA + K -Fact: $\exists r^f \in \mathbb{R}$, $\lambda = [\lambda_1, \dots, \lambda_K]' \in \mathbb{R}^K$:

$$\sum_{i=1}^n \left[\bar{r}_i - (r^f + \lambda' \beta_i) \right]^2 = \sum_{i=1}^n \left[\bar{r}_i - \left(r^f + \sum_{k=1}^K \lambda_k \beta_{ik} \right) \right]^2 < A < \infty$$

NAA $\Rightarrow$ approx. factor pricing: $\bar{r}_i - r^f \approx \sum_{k=1}^K \lambda_k \beta_{ik}$, $\forall i$

Optimal Portfolio Choices

Expected Utility (E.U.) Theory

Continuity: $\forall c \in C$: $\{a \in C : a \succ c\}$ & $\{b \in C : b \preccurlyeq c\}$ closed

$\Leftrightarrow \forall \{a_n\} \rightarrow a$, $\{b_n\} \rightarrow b \in C$: $a_n \succ b_n \Rightarrow a \succ b$

Insatiability: $a > b \Rightarrow a \succ b$ (more $\succ$ less)

Convexity: $\forall \alpha \in (0, 1)$: $a \succcurlyeq b$ & $c \succcurlyeq b \Rightarrow \alpha a + (1 - \alpha)c \succcurlyeq b$

Prop: Convex $\Rightarrow$ convex sets of preferred bundles $\{a \in C : a \succcurlyeq c\}$

EU: over consump path/lottery $u(c, p) = \sum_{\omega \in \Omega} p_\omega u_\omega(c, c_{1\omega})$, $c \in C$.

Continuity: $\forall$ consumption $c \in C$, probas p_a, p_b, p_c :

$[c, p_a] \succcurlyeq [c, p_b] \succcurlyeq [c, p_c] \Rightarrow \exists \alpha \in (0, 1) : [c, p_b] \sim [c, (1 - \alpha)p_a + \alpha p_c]$

Indep: $\forall$ consumption $c \in C$, $\alpha, p_a, p_b, p_c \in (0, 1)$: $[c, p_a] \succcurlyeq [c, p_b]$

$\Rightarrow [c, (1 - \alpha)p_a + \alpha p_c] \succcurlyeq [c, (1 - \alpha)p_b + \alpha p_c]$

Assume: $u(c, p) = u(c_0) + \rho \sum_{\omega \in \Omega} p_\omega u(c_{1\omega})$ with $\rho \in (0, 1)$

Marginal Utility: At consumption level c : $u'(c)$

Prop: Insatiability $\Rightarrow u$ is strictly $\nearrow$, $u' > 0$

Concave: $u(\alpha x + (1 - \alpha)x') \geq \alpha u(x) + (1 - \alpha)u(x')$

Prop: u concave & twice differentiable $\Leftrightarrow u'' \leq 0$, $u' \searrow$

Risk-Aversion

Risk Aversion: $\mathbb{E}[u(w + x)] \leq \mathbb{E}[u(w)]$ for any $\mathbb{E}[x] = 0$.

Risk Prem: $\mathbb{E}[x] = 0$, EU u , wealth w : $\mathbb{E}[u(w + x)] = u(w - \pi)$

Certainty Equivalent: $u(w_{CE}) = \mathbb{E}[u(w)]$

Abs RA: $A(w) = -\frac{u''(w)}{u'(w)}$ **Prop: Small Gamble x :** $\pi \approx \frac{1}{2} A \cdot \text{Var}(x)$

$(\because) \mathbb{E}[u(w + x)] = u(w) + \frac{1}{2} u''(w) \mathbb{E}[x^2] \stackrel{!}{=} u(w - \pi) = u(w) - u'(w) \pi$

Rel RA: $R(w) = -w \frac{u''(w)}{u'(w)}$ **Prop: Small Risk wx :** $\pi_R \approx \frac{1}{2} R \cdot \text{Var}(x)$

$(\because) \mathbb{E}[u(w(1 + x))] = u(w(1 - \pi_R))$

Prop: Pratt: Agents 1 & 2 w/ EU u_1 & u_2 : $A_1(w) \geq A_2(w) \forall w$

$\Leftrightarrow u_1(u_2^{-1}(\cdot))$ concave $\Leftrightarrow \pi_1 \geq \pi_2$, $\forall w$ & fair gambles x

$\Leftrightarrow \exists f$ s.t: $f' > 0$, $f'' \leq 0$ & $u_1(w) = f(u_2(w))$

Risk Neutr: $A(w) = R(w) = 0$, **Linear EU:** $u(w) = w$

CARA: $A'(w) = 0$, **Negative Exp EU:** $u(w) = -e^{-aw}$, $a > 0$

$\Rightarrow$ **CARA** agents: $A(w) = a$, $R(w) = aw$

CRRA $R'(w) = 0$, **Power EU** $u(w) = \frac{1}{1-\gamma} w^{1-\gamma}$, $\gamma > 1$

$\Rightarrow$ **CRRA** agents: $A(w) = \gamma/w$, $R(w) = \gamma$ **Prop: $\gamma \rightarrow 1 \Rightarrow$ Log EU**

Log EU: $u(w) = \log w \Rightarrow$ **CRRA** agents: $A(w) = 1/w$, $R(w) = 1$

IARA/DARA: $A'(w) \geq 0$; **IRRA/DRRA:** $R'(w) \geq 0$

Quadratic EU: $u(w) = w - 0.5aw^2$, $a > 0$, $w \in [0, 1/a]$

$\Rightarrow$ **IARA** agents: $A(w) = \frac{a}{1-aw}$, $R(w) = \frac{aw}{1-aw}$

Optimal Consumption/Portfolio Choice

Setting: N non-redund assets, payoff D , price P

Agent: Endowt $e = [e_0, e_1']'$, Consumpt plan $c = [c_0, c_1']'$, Portf θ

EU: $u(c) = u_0(c_0) + \mathbb{E}[u_1(c_1)]$ with $u_t' > 0$, $u_t'' < 0$ ($t = 0, 1$)

Agnt Opt: $\max_\theta u_0(c_0) + \mathbb{E}[u_1(c_1)]$ s.t. $c_0 = e_0 - P'\theta$, $c_1 = e_1 + D\theta$

$P'\theta = e_0 - c_0$ = time-0 savings

Assumptions (Complete Market)

Complete set of AD securities, State Price $\phi \gg 0$

Agent: endowment $e = [e_0, e_1']'$, wealth $w = e_0 + \phi' e_1$

Budget: $B(e) = \{c : c_0 + \phi' c_1 = w\}$ (Simplify: ignore $c \geq 0$)

Marginal cost = ϕ_ω : Additional \$1 in asset $w \Rightarrow c_{1\omega} \nearrow$ by $1/\phi_\omega$

Proposition (Optimization) $\max_{c_0 + \phi' c_1 = w} u_0(c_0) + \sum_\omega p_\omega u_1(c_{1\omega})$

Lagrang: $\mathcal{L} = u_0(c_0) + \sum_\omega p_\omega u_1(c_{1\omega}) - \lambda [c_0 + \phi' c_1 - w] \rightarrow \partial_{c_0}, \partial_{c_1}$

FOC: $\lambda = u_0'(c_0) \rightarrow$ marginal value of wealth

$\lambda \phi_\omega = p_\omega u_1'(c_{1\omega}) = \frac{\partial \mathbb{E}[u_1(c_1)]}{\partial \theta_\omega} \rightarrow$ margin benefit of $\nearrow c_{1\omega} = \theta_\omega D_{1\omega}$

$\eta_\omega = \frac{\phi_\omega}{p_\omega} = \frac{u_1'(c_{1\omega})}{u_0'(c_0)} = \text{intertemp marg rate of substitution}$, $\frac{\phi_\omega}{\phi_{\omega'}} = \frac{p_\omega u_1'(c_{1\omega})}{p_{\omega'} u_1'(c_{1\omega'})}$

Prop: u_t strictly concave $\Rightarrow u_t'$ strictly $\searrow$ & $u_t'^{-1}$ exists

Theorem (Optimal Portfolio Choice*)** Solve FOC:

$c_0 = u_0'^{-1}(\lambda)$ and $c_{1\omega} = u_1'^{-1}\left(\lambda \frac{\phi_\omega}{p_\omega}\right) \forall \omega \in \Omega$

where λ solves budget constraint: $w = e_0 + \phi' e_1 = c_0(\lambda) + \phi' c_1(\lambda)$

Characterization of Optimal Portfolio:

Proposition (Optimization) $\max_\theta u_0(e_0 - P'\theta) + \mathbb{E}[u_1(e_1 + D\theta)]$
 $= \max_\theta u_0(e_0 - P'\theta) + \sum_\omega p_\omega u_1\left(e_{1\omega} + \sum_{n=1}^N \theta_n D_{1n\omega}\right)$

Euler Eqn: FOC: $u_0'(c_0) P_n = \mathbb{E}[u_1'(c_1) D_n]$, $n = 1..N$

Prop: Portf Decomp: Agent's $t = 0$ savings: $w = e_0 - c_0 = P'\theta$

$\Rightarrow$ Optimal consumpt/portf choice: $\max_\omega \{u_0(e_0 - w) + v_1(w)\}$

v function: $v_1(w) = \max_{\{\theta: P'\theta = w\}} \mathbb{E}[u_1(e_1 + D\theta)]$

Example: (Special Case) $e_1 = 0$ (agent endowed only with e_0 cash)

$\Rightarrow$ Portf Choice Pb: $v(w) = \max_{\{\theta: P'\theta = w\}} \mathbb{E}[u_1(D\theta)]$

Riskless asset: asset N with gross return $R_n = 1 + r^f$

$a_n = \theta_n P_n$: \$ invested in asset $n \Rightarrow w = \sum_n a_n$ **total investment**

Portf payoff: $\tilde{w} = D\theta = \sum_{n=1}^N a_n R_n = w(1 + r^f) + \sum_{n=1}^{N-1} a_n (r_n - r^f)$

Excess Return of asset n : $r_n - r^f$

General Pb: $r = [r_1, \dots, r_{N-1}]'$ risky; $a = [a_1, \dots, a_{N-1}]'$ investment;

Optimal Portf: $\max_a \mathbb{E}[u(\tilde{w})] = \max_a \mathbb{E}\left[u\left(w(1 + r^f) + (r - r^f \iota')a\right)\right]$

$\Rightarrow$ FOC: $\mathbb{E}\left[u'(\tilde{w})(r_n - r^f)\right] = 0 \forall n = 1..N - 1$

Properties of Optimal Portfolio:

Case 1: Assume only **ONE** risky asset:

Prop: $\tilde{w} = w(1 + r^f) + a(r - r^f)$ ($\because$) borrow at r^f , invest risky

Prop: Opt Investment a: Agent = strictly RA

$a > 0 \Leftrightarrow \bar{r} > r^f$; $a < 0 \Leftrightarrow \bar{r} < r^f$; $a = 0 \Leftrightarrow r = r^f$

Prop: risk-premium $> 0 \Rightarrow$ agent invest at least ε in risky asset

Proposition (Abs RA) Assume $\bar{r} - r^f > 0$ (so $a > 0$)

$a'(w) > 0 \Leftrightarrow A'(w) < 0$ (DARA); $a'(w) = 0 \Leftrightarrow A'(w) = 0$ (CARA)

$a'(w) < 0 \Leftrightarrow A'(w) > 0$ (IARA $\rightarrow$ very rare)

Prop: You see from FOC diff: $\frac{da}{dw} = -(1 + r^f) \frac{\mathbb{E}[u''(\tilde{w})(r - r^f)]}{\mathbb{E}[u''(\tilde{w})(r - r^f)^2]}$

Relative Propensity: for investor in risky asset: $e(w) = \frac{w}{a} \frac{da}{dw}$

Note: $e(w) = 1 \Leftrightarrow a(w) = \bar{a} \cdot w$: risky invest^M = CST fract^o of wealth

Prop: Rel RA: Assume $\bar{r} - r^f > 0$ (so $a > 0$)

$e(w) > 1 \Leftrightarrow R'(w) < 0$ (DRRA); $e(w) = 1 \Leftrightarrow R'(w) = 0$ (CRRA)

$e(w) < 1 \Leftrightarrow R'(w) > 0$ (IRRA $\rightarrow$ very rare)</

In Practice

Consumption Choice Problem 1:

Setup: $M=2$ states, $N=2$ assets (1 RF + 1 risky)

$t=1$ returns: $R = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & u \\ 1 & d \end{bmatrix}$, probs: π_u, π_d .

Agent: initial wealth w_0 , final $w_1 = 0$.

Portf Weights (RF/Risky asset): $\alpha = [\alpha_1, \alpha_2]'$

Max Prob: $\max_{c_0, c_1, \alpha} \log c_0 + \beta \mathbb{E}[\log c_1]$

2 Budget Constraints: $c_1 = (w_0 - c_0)R\alpha$

(a) Find optimal $\alpha = \alpha(w_0, c_0, c_1)$:

Complete Market: $\exists R^{-1} \implies \alpha = \frac{1}{w_0 - c_0} R^{-1} \cdot c_1$

(b) Rewrite Constraints Using Only (w_0, c_0, c_1) :

$\phi = P'R^{-1}$ with $P = [1, 1]'$ so $\eta_u = \frac{\phi_u}{\pi_u}, \eta_d = \frac{\phi_d}{\pi_d}$

$\implies$ Constraint: $w_0 := c_0 + \mathbb{E}[\eta c_1] = c_0 + \pi_u \eta_u c_{1,u} + \pi_d \eta_d c_{1,d}$

(c) Optimize over (c_0, c_1) + Find $c_0(\lambda), c_1(\lambda)$:

$\max_{c_0, c_1} \log c_0 + \beta \mathbb{E}[\log c_1]$ s.t. $w_0 = c_0 + \pi_u \eta_u c_{1,u} + \pi_d \eta_d c_{1,d}$

$\mathcal{L} = \log c_0 + \beta \mathbb{E}[\log c_1] - \lambda (c_0 + \pi_u \eta_u c_{1,u} + \pi_d \eta_d c_{1,d} - w_0)$
 $\stackrel{c_0}{=} \lambda = 1/c_0$; $\stackrel{c_{1,s}}{=} \lambda \pi_s \eta_s = \beta \pi_s / c_{1,s}$ with $s = u, d$

$\implies c_0 = \frac{1}{\lambda} \quad c_{1,u} = \frac{\beta}{\lambda \eta_u} = \frac{c_0 \beta}{\eta_u} \quad c_{1,d} = \frac{\beta}{\lambda \eta_d} = \frac{c_0 \beta}{\eta_d}$

(d) Plug λ in constraint + Get $\lambda = \lambda(w_0)$:

$w_0 = c_0 + \pi_u \eta_u c_{1,u} + \pi_d \eta_d c_{1,d} = \frac{1}{\lambda} + \frac{\pi_u \beta}{\lambda} + \frac{\pi_d \beta}{\lambda}$

$\implies \lambda = \frac{1+\beta}{w_0}$

(e) Get $c_0(w_0), c_1(w_0)$:

$c_0 = \frac{w_0}{1+\beta} \quad c_{1,u} = \frac{\beta}{1+\beta} \frac{w_0}{\eta_u} \quad c_{1,d} = \frac{\beta}{1+\beta} \frac{w_0}{\eta_d}$

Consumption Choice Problem 2:

Setup: 1 RF (return r^f) + 1 Risky asset:

$r = \bar{r} + \sigma \varepsilon \quad \varepsilon \sim N(0, 1) \quad (\bar{r} > r^f)$

Agent: $e_0 > 0$ and $e_1 = h\varepsilon$ ($h > 0$)

Maximize: $\max_{c_0, c_1} -e^{-\alpha c_0} - \rho \mathbb{E}[e^{-\alpha c_1}]$, $\alpha > 0$ cst

(a) Invest a in risky asset:

Write $t = 1$ consumption $c_1 = c_1(e_0, e_1, c_0, a, r^f, r)$

$c_1 = e_1 + w(1 + r^f) + a(r - r^f) = e_1 + (e_0 - c_0)(1 + r^f) + a(r - r^f)$

(b) Write optimal portf choice problem:

$\max_{c_0, a} -e^{-\alpha c_0} - \rho \mathbb{E}\left[e^{-\alpha(e_1 + (e_0 - c_0)(1 + r^f) + a(r - r^f))}\right]$

(c) Write FOC: $\frac{d}{da}$ and $\frac{d}{dc_0}$

(d) Solve FOC for Opt Portf Choice problem: Get a, c_0

(e) How does h influences c_0 and a ?

$c_0 \searrow$ in h . Higher uncertainty about $e_1 \implies$ lower certainty

equivalent of this payoff. When h is high: agent feels poorer $\Rightarrow$ wants to consume less.

$a \searrow$ in h . Higher uncertainty about $e_1 \implies$ less willingness to invest in the risky asset (adds risk to c_1).

Consumption Choice Problem 3:

Setup: 1 RF (asset 0) + N risky assets: $n = 1, \dots, N$

Returns: $R_0 = R^f = 1$ and $D_n = \bar{D} + \varepsilon_n$ ($n = 1..N$), $\varepsilon_n \stackrel{iid}{\sim} N(0, \sigma)$

Prices: $P_0 = 1, P_n = P$ for all n

Agent: CARA $u(w) = -e^{-aw}$, $a > 0$

Endowment: 1 share of each asset n , 0 shares of RF.

Portfolio holdings of risky assets: $\theta = [\theta_1, \dots, \theta_N]' \in \mathbb{R}^N$

(a) Write agent's wealth $\tilde{w}$ at $t = 1$:

$$\tilde{w} = \sum_{n=1}^N \underbrace{\theta_n D_n}_{\text{Asset } n \text{ Payoff}} + \underbrace{\frac{1}{P_0} \left(\sum_{n=1}^N P_n \right)}_{\text{t=0 wealth (endowment)}} - \sum_{n=1}^N \underbrace{\theta_n P_n}_{\text{wealth invested in risky assets}}$$

(b) Write Optimal Portf Choice Pb:

$\max_{\theta} \mathbb{E}[-e^{-a\tilde{w}}]$ s.t. $\tilde{w} = \sum_{n=1}^N \theta_n D_n + \sum_{n=1}^N (1 - \theta_n) P_n$

$D_n \stackrel{iid}{\sim} N(\bar{D}, \sigma^2)$

$\implies \tilde{w} \sim N\left(\sum_{n=1}^N \theta_n \bar{D}_n + \sum_{n=1}^N (1 - \theta_n) P_n, \sigma^2 \sum_{n=1}^N \theta_n^2\right)$

$\Rightarrow -a\tilde{w} \sim N\left(-a \sum_{n=1}^N \theta_n \bar{D}_n - a \sum_{n=1}^N (1 - \theta_n) P_n, a^2 \sigma^2 \sum_{n=1}^N \theta_n^2\right)$

$\mathbb{E}[-e^{-a\tilde{w}}] = -\exp\left(-a \sum_{n=1}^N \theta_n \bar{D}_n - a \sum_{n=1}^N (1 - \theta_n) P_n + \frac{a^2}{2} \sigma^2 \sum_{n=1}^N \theta_n^2\right)$

$\implies \max_{\theta} \sum_{n=1}^N \theta_n \bar{D}_n + \sum_{n=1}^N (1 - \theta_n) P_n - \frac{a}{2} \sigma^2 \sum_{n=1}^N \theta_n^2$

(c) Solve Optimal Portf Pb: FOC w.r.t. θ_n

$\bar{D} - P_n - a\sigma^2 \theta_n = 0 \implies \theta_n = \frac{\bar{D} - P_n}{a\sigma^2}$

(d) Show: for different values of RA a, 2-Fund Separation Holds:

Initial Wealth of Agents: $w_0 = \sum_{n=1}^N P_n$

$\implies$ agents invest optimally fractions

$\frac{\theta_n P_n}{w_0} = \frac{1}{a} \frac{(\bar{D} - P_n) P_n}{w_0 \sigma^2}$ of wealth in asset n

and $1 - \frac{1}{a} \frac{(\bar{D} - P_n) P_n}{w_0 \sigma^2}$ in RF asset

$\implies$ agents hold lin comb of RF asset

and risky portf $x_M = [x_1, \dots, x_N]'$ ($x_n = \frac{(\bar{D} - P_n) P_n}{w_0 \sigma^2}$)

Depending on RA: Hold $\frac{1}{a} X_M$ in risky & $1 - \frac{1}{a} X_M'$ in RF

(e) If agent = only agent in market

Find Equilibrium Risky Prices P_n

Market Clearing: $1 \stackrel{!}{=} \theta_n = \frac{\bar{D} - P_n}{a\sigma^2} \implies P_n = \bar{D} - a\sigma^2$

(f) Find Risk Premium on Risky Assets + $N \rightarrow \infty$ Limit:

$\pi_n = \bar{R}_n - R^f = \mathbb{E}[R_n] - 1 = \frac{\mathbb{E}[D_n]}{P_n} - 1 = \frac{a\sigma^2}{\bar{D} - a\sigma^2}$ indep of N

(g) Does APT Hold in this Market when $N \rightarrow \infty$?

$\exists$ Asymptotic Arbitrage in this Market: (so APT can't hold)

Seq of arb portf: $\theta_0^N = -1, \theta_n^N = \frac{1}{N} \forall n$

$\implies \mathbb{E}[r_{\theta^N}] = \sum_{n=1}^N \frac{1}{N} \bar{r}_n - 1 = \bar{r}_1 - 1 = \pi_1 = \frac{a\sigma^2}{\bar{D} - a\sigma^2} > 0$

While $\text{Var}(r_{\theta^N}) = \sum_{n=1}^N \frac{1}{N^2} \text{Var}(\varepsilon_n) = \frac{\sigma^2}{N} \rightarrow 0$